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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions that are determinative in this appeal. Utah 
Code Ann. §30-3-5(7)(a)(1995) codifies four factors trial courts must consider in 
determining alimony. Utah Code Ann. § (1995) codifies the court's discretionary 
authority to award attorney's fees in a domestic case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
The principal parties, Brad Chapman and Desire Chapman, litigated a contested 
divorce action over custody, support, alimony and some property issues. Title to the 
marital home had been placed in the names of George and Marge Chapman, Brad 
Chapman's parents. They were named parties in order to determine ownership and equity 
in the home. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce were signed 
on April 9, 1999. Brad Chapman filed a "Notice of Appeal" on May 7, 1999 to the 
"Supreme Court" (R.590). George and Marge Chapman did not appeal the trial court's 
decree relating to any issues involving them. Desire Chapman did not cross-appeal on 
any issues. 
Course of the Proceedings: 
Numerous hearings were held during the course of this litigation. The original 
trial set for January 12, 1999 was continued by request and motion of Brad Chapman 
(R.464-496). Trial was reset for February 12, 1999 and then continued until February 25, 
6 
1999, since all testimony had not been completed. 
Disposition of Trial Court: 
On February 25, 1999 the trial court issued its bench ruling. (R.613, pp. 137-142, 
February 25, 1999 transcript). The Trial Court awarded sole custody of the parties' minor 
children to Mrs. Chapman, subject to Mr. Chapman's right to standard visitation. The 
court further ordered Mr. Chapman to pay $779.00 in child support each month, $500.00 
in alimony each month, and to pay Mrs. Chapman's attorney's fees in the amount of 
$14,550.00. The court directed that Desire Chapman's attorney prepare the "Findings" 
and "Decree" for review and signing by the trial court. These documents were signed on 
April 9, 1999. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Brad and Desire Chapman were married on August 22, 1981. Their marriage 
lasted a period of 17.5 years up to the date of the divorce trial. Three children were born 
as issue of their marriage. These children are: Corey Shane Chapman, born January 4, 
1986; Khristopher Devin Chapman, born February 22, 1988; and Dakota Raven 
Chapman, born February 8, 1995. (R.529,530) 
During the five (5) years prior to the divorce, Mr. Chapman worked at Altice-
Prescom Electronics, Inc. in Ogden, Utah. While employed at Altice-Prescom, the court 
found that Mr. Chapman earned wages of $34,610.00 in 1994, $34,322.16 in 1995, 
$34,489.37 in 1996, $43,321.34 in 1997 and $31,936.96 in 1998. (R.612, pp.91-92, 
February 12, 1999 transcript; see also Plaintiff Exhibit #5) Mr. Chapman's five year 
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annual income averaged $35,735.97, or $2,978.00 per month. The court based his 
income on a five year average. (R. 535; R.613 p.137). 
Mrs. Chapman, for the five (5) years prior to the divorce, was a housewife, had 
part-time employment as a bookkeeper and secretary for a small motor repair shop. She 
worked part-time as a real estate receptionist and salesperson and worked part-time as a 
secretary for Brigham City Corporation (R.613 p. 87-90; Plaintiff Exhibit #3). For 1995 
she showed negative income of $843.47. For 1996 she showed negative income of 
$1,950.00. For 1997 she had commissions of $12,494.01 reported on a 1099 form as a 
real estate salesperson, but since they had not filed a tax return, her necessary and 
reasonable business expenses had not been determined, therefore, her "real" income was 
not available for that year. In calendar year 1998, her only income was wages of 
$5,798.04. Beginning in late 1998 and early 1999 she worked on a part-time basis for 
Brigham City Corporation. Mrs. Chapman had not averaged even minimum wage for the 
five years prior to the divorce. Mrs. Chapman consented to imputed income at the federal 
minimum wage of $893.00 per month. (R.613 p.91) The court imputed income to her 
based on the theory that she should be able to work at a regular job making minimum 
wage. Since she had no recent work history suggesting she could make more than that 
amount on a full time basis, that was the Court's finding of her income.1 (R.535; R.613 
]In Mr. Chapman's brief (p.9) he asserts Mrs. Chapman is capable of earning "in excess 
of $40,000.00 per year." No credible evidence was produced at trial to support this exaggerated 
income amount. The trial court clearly ruled her income was less than minimum wage, and 
imputed income at federal minimum wage with her consent. (R.535) 
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p.138) 
The parties began experiencing marital difficulties and disagreements in their 
marriage. Those included the fact that Mr. Chapman's father organized his own church, 
"The Church of Individual Responsibility", that Brad Chapman joined. Mrs. Chapman 
and the children remained with their faith (R.613 p.79; p.21-22). 
The marriage relationship began having more serious problems when Desire and 
Brad Chapman came up with a method to refinance their home in order to make 
improvements to the home. Their plan involved conveying legal title to the names of 
George and Marge Chapman. George Chapman used his veteran's benefits to secure a 
Veteran's Administration loan on the home. The proceeds were to be used, in part, to 
remodel the home, and Brad and Desire Chapman made all mortgage payments directly 
to the lien holder, until after the divorce was filed. Serious disagreements arose as to the 
expenditures of the money which was received from the Veteran's Administration loan. 
(R.536-537; R.612 pp. 96-113) These conflicts ultimately resulted in the parties' 
separation. Brad Chapman, the husband, lived in the basement and Desire Chapman, the 
wife, lived upstairs with their three children. (R.521) 
The unremitting accusations regarding the expenditure of the loan proceeds 
compelled Desire Chapman to file the divorce action and to seek a divorce from her 
husband. During the litigation, Mrs. Chapman amended her complaint to name George 
and Marge Chapman as parties since legal title was in their names (R.013-018) and to 
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receive court protection to keep her from being evicted by them.2 (R. 239). In the spring 
of 1998 Desire Chapman's father attempted to purchase the home for his daughter. 
(R.216-226) That was objected to by all respondents. (R.227; 242) Efforts to sell the 
home to other parties were not successful. (R.537) Brad Chapman was ordered by the 
court to make the house payments. (R.051) He did not make any payments after April of 
1998. Ultimately, the house was sold at a trustee sale. (R.537) The divorce litigation was 
costly in the expenditure of attorney's fees. On numerous occasions Desire Chapman, 
through her attorney, stated that the numerous hearings, motions, objections to rulings, 
appointment of evaluators, and employment of experts was more costly than the case 
deserved.3 (R.610 pp.6-7) (R.613 pp.l33-134)(R.492) 
2During the divorce, Mr. Chapman's parents tried to evict Desire Chapman and her 
children from the home. George and Marge Chapman were named as additional defendants in 
the divorce action to determine ownership of the home (R.613). The court ultimately ruled that 
Desi and Brad Chapman owned the home (R.536-537). Under the temporary order of the court, 
Brad Chapman was required to pay the mortgage payment (R.051). He failed to make the 
payments and prior to trial, the home was sold at trustee sale by the first lien holder on February 
1, 1999. 
3The initial hearing on a temporary order was held on December 17, 1997 resulting in an 
"Order on Order to Show Cause" being entered by the Court on January 8, 1998 (R.050-062) 
An objection was made to this "order" but, the trial judge signed the "Order on Order to Show 
Cause". A second hearing was held on February 24, 1998 (R. 150-152). That resulted in a 
second "Order on Order to Show Cause" being signed by the court. (R. 164-167) That "Order" 
was objected to by the Defendant. (R. 168-172) A third "Order to Show Cause" was held on 
July 2, 1998, which then was continued to August 17, 1998 (R.309). A fourth "Order to Show 
Cause" hearing was held on September 15, 1998 (R.337-329), which resulted in an additional 
"Order on Order to Show Cause" being entered by the court (R.350-353). A fifth hearing on 
"Order to Show Cause" was held on October 27, 1998 (R.393-395) The "Findings and Order on 
Order to Show Cause" were prepared, sent to the court and ultimately signed (R. 403-406). 
Another hearing was held on December 10, 1998 (R. 453-454). In addition to the numerous 
hearings held prior to trial, there were multiple motions requiring responses, all of which 
substantially increased the costs of the litigation. 
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The court appointed Dr. T. Brent Price to be its custody evaluator. (R.181 p.6) Dr. 
Price completed his custody evaluation in June 1998. Brad Chapman did not agree with 
the court appointed evaluator's recommendation and stated that he wanted to obtain a 
second evaluation, (R.328). He never did employ an evaluator, but hired an expert to 
"comment" upon Dr. Price's methodology. Mr. Chapman also required Desire Chapman 
to submit to psychological evaluations. Mr. Chapman was ordered to furnish his own 
psychological test results, but did not do so. (R.352) Mrs. Chapman, of her own volition, 
had a MMPI 2 test administered and submitted to Mr. Chapman by Chuck Sharp. (R.493-
495). She also was tested by Dr. Heather Walker.4 
Trial was ultimately held on February 12, 1999. Mr. Chapman did not complete 
his case on that date. Accordingly, the case was completed February 25, 1999. The court 
issued a ruling from the bench and requested that Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and a Decree of Divorce be prepared for review and signing by the court. The 
"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" and "Decree of Divorce" were mailed on 
March 22, 1999 to the attorney for the respondent. The original "Findings" and "Decree" 
were filed with the court on March 23, 1999 (R.529-576). No objections or motion to 
amend were taken to the "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" or the "Decree of 
Divorce" by the respondent and the same were signed and entered by the court on April 9, 
4While the testing by Heather Walker, Ph.D. was not admitted in evidence by the court, 
nor offered as part of the court record, a copy did find itself in the "received exhibits" as 
"Defendant's Exhibit #40". The court exhibit list shows exhibit 40 to be a promissory note Brad 
Chapman gave to the Church of Individual Responsibility. Dr. Walker's report likely was a 
mismarked document. 
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1999. (R.529-576) Copies of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are attached as 
addendum #1. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court considered the appropriate factors in awarding alimony and the 
court specifically found that Mr. Chapman had the ability to pay the alimony as ordered 
by the trial court. 
2. The trial court found that Mrs. Chapman's attorney fees were reasonable, that 
Mr. Chapman should pay the attorney's fees in the amount of $14,550.00 and that he had 
the ability to make said payments. 
3. Since the trial court awarded attorney's fees in the divorce action, the court of 




THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ALIMONY IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(7)(a),(b),(c) and (d) state as follows: 
"(7)(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors 
in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in 
determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
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existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in 
accordance with Subsection (a). However, the court shall consider 
all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, 
base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of 
trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have been 
conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the 
standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to 
equalize the parties' respective standards of living." 
Each of these statutory factors was considered by the trial court, and the findings 
of the trial court dealing with alimony reflect these considerations. 
Paragraph 16 of the Court's Findings of Fact (R.538-539) provides: 
"ALIMONY 
16. The court finds that this is a long term marriage 
as defined under Utah State Law and Case Law. The parties 
have been married 17.5 years. The court finds that Mr. 
Chapman has monthly income of $2,978.00 and that his share 
of the child support would be $779.00 leaving him with 
"before tax" income of $2,199.00 per month. The court finds 
that Mrs. Chapman has monthly income of $893.00 and her 
share of the child support would be $233.00 leaving her with 
"before tax" income of $660.00. The court recognizes that 
each party has certain tax consequences as the amount of 
money calculated does not take into account withholding for 
taxes. The court finds that Mrs. Chapman has needs as shown 
by her Exhibit 10 of $3,257.11 which is the standard of living 
which she enjoyed during the marriage. Her needs exceed the 
amount of money Mr. Chapman has available to contribute to 
her alimony. While Mr. Chapman did not set forth a specific 
monthly expense amount, the court assumes that he has 
certain basic living costs and expenses. The court determines 
that because this is a long term marriage, the court should 
equalize the post-divorce standard of living. Mrs. Chapman 
actually sought the amount of $770.00 by way of alimony 
asserting that would equalize the parties post divorce standard 
of living, (see petitioner's exhibit 6). The court believes, 
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however, that Mr. Chapman would basically need $1,699.00 
less the tax consequences and therefore, he has the ability to 
pay alimony in the amount of $500.00 per month. 
Alimony shall begin with the month of February 1999. 
One-half shall be due on the 5th day of February and one-half 
on the 20th day of February and one-half on the 5th and 20th 
days of each month thereafter." 
A reading of the Findings made by the court demonstrates that the court 
considered each of the criteria required by statute and case law. 
The court found: (i) the "financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse"; 
(the court found her standard of living to be $3,257.11 which she enjoyed during the 
marriage, the court also found she had lost the marital home which had been foreclosed). 
(R.537); (ii) The "recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income" (monthly 
income was imputed to her of $893.00);5 (iii) "The ability of the payor spouse to provide 
5In his brief, Mr. Chapman asserts that income should have been imputed to Mrs. 
Chapman at a "higher" level. Her exhibit 6 shows her four (4) year average income was only 
$322.89 per month. Even assuming she had no reasonable or necessary business expenses in 
1997, her monthly average income for 1997 and 1998 was only $762.17 per month. Utah Code 
Annotated §78-45-7.5 provides: 
(7)(a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the 
amount imputed, the party defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and a 
finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, 
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community, or the median earnings for persons in the same 
occupation in the same geographical area as found in the statistics maintained by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or their occupation is unknown, 
income shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work 
week. To impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the 
presiding officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of 
fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation." 
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support", (Mr. Chapman had a five year average monthly income of $2,978.00, his share 
of the child support would be $779.00, leaving him with before tax income of $2,199.00. 
When the alimony of $500.00 was deducted, he would have $1,699.00 less the tax 
consequences); and (iv) The court found the marriage lasted 17.5 years. 
Mr. Chapman did not furnish to the court an itemization of his "needs" or his 
"standard of living." The only evidence about his needs was his testimony that the only 
post-divorce expenses he claimed were: a car payment of $256.00 and a Circuit City debt 
of $15.00 and an unspecified monthly payment to his "Church" for around $5,000.00 in 
loans (R.613, Feb. 25, 1999 Transcript p.63). His combined child support and alimony 
payments are $1,279.00. Since Mr. Chapman did not file income tax returns for 1997 or 
1998 the tax consequences on his income were uncertain. Thus, the trial court found that 
after paying his child support and alimony he had $1,699.00 of "before tax income." 
(R.539). Since his only itemized debts totaled $271.00 plus the dubious payment to his 
Church, he had discretionary income for his monthly living expense of $1,428.00. The 
court considered his ability to pay, and determined he could pay $500.00 per month 
alimony and still have $1,428.00 for monthly living expenses. 
The court also considered Mrs. Chapman's claim for an income equalization and 
While this statute applies to imputed income for child support, the same rationale would apply to 
imputed income for alimony (if imputed income is appropriate for alimony). The failure of Mr. 
Chapman to offer any evidence of different imputed income at trial makes his argument 
inappropriate on appeal. 
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actually gave her less than a true income equalization would have provided. (She asked 
for $770.00 by way of income equalization and the court awarded her $500.00) 
Mr. Chapman also acknowledged he paid to her $1,300.00 per month during their 
separation, (R.631) and prior to her filing her divorce action. The trial court correctly 
determined he had the ability to pay $500.00 per month alimony. 
Appellate level decisions have repeatedly stated that the trial court, having 
considered the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse, the ability of the 
receiving spouse to produce sufficient income and the ability of the supporting spouse to 
provide support meets the criteria of the court. Trial courts have considerable discretion 
in determining alimony and their awards will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated. See Brienholt v. Brienholt, 905 P.2d 
877(Utah App 1995); Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1993); and Howell v. 
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991, cert, denied 817 P.2d 327) 
In October of 1998, the Court of Appeals released its decision in Childs v. Childs, 
967 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1998). In examining the wife's challenge to the alimony award 
on the basis that it was insufficient, the Court of Appeals stated: 
"Trial courts have broad discretion in making alimony awards." See 
Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421,423 (Utah App. 1990). Therefore we 
will not disturb a trial court's alimony awards so long as the trial court 
exercised its discretion within the appropriate legal standards, see id., and 
"supported its decision with adequate findings and conclusions...' Naranjo 
v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah App. 1998)(citations omitted)." 967 
P.2d 946. 
The court then went on to note: 
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If these factors have been considered, "we will not disturb the trial court's 
alimony award unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion.'" Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 
1992) (Citations omitted)." 967 P.2 946. 
Alimony awards are highly fact sensitive. In Crompton v. Crompton, 888 P.2d 
686, 689 (Utah App. 1994) this court stated: 
"...because the needs of the parties to a marriage are defined by the parties' 
own decisions concerning their standard of living, an alimony award is 
highly fact specific and dependant on the parties themselves. For this 
reason, trial courts are given broad discretion to determine the standard of 
living that existed during the marriage in an effort to equalize the parties' 
post-divorce status." (emphasis added) 
If Mr. Chapman's argument is that the court's findings regarding his ability to pay 
are not supported by the evidence, it is his burden to marshal all evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the factual determination made by the trial court, the evidence is insufficient 
to support its findings. See Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1991); see also Campbell 
v. Campbell 896 P.2d 635 (Utah Ct.App. 1995). 
The record supports the trial court's findings and its alimony award, as all 
statutory or Jones factors were considered by the trial court. This is particularly true 
where the court determined that the amount of alimony did not permit Mrs. Chapman to 
maintain her standard of living even by trying to equalize the parties' post-divorce 




THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT MR. CHAPMAN SHOULD PAY 
HIS WIFE'S ATTORNEY FEES IS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND BY 
ITS DETERMINATION THAT HE HAS THE ABILITY TO PAY HER FEES. 
Paragraph 22 of the Findings of Fact reads as follows: 
"ATTORNEY'S FEES 
22. The court has previously expressed its concern that the attorney fees 
in this matter have exceeded what the court normally would expect in a divorce 
action. The court further notes that there has been numerous motions and filings 
made by Mr. Chapman and his parents regarding the home. There has been no 
evidence that Mrs. Chapman interfered in any respect to the sale of the home. The 
court finds that Mrs. Chapman has expended $14,550.00 as and for attorney fees. 
The court finds that her attorney, Mr. Thorne, has expended 116.4 hours which the 
court finds to be justified dealing with the numerous matters which have been 
brought before the court and in preparation for this matter. The court finds that the 
charges of $125.00 per hour are reasonable. The court further finds that much of 
those expenses have been incurred because of the actions of Mr. Chapman in 
contesting the custody of the minor children. The court makes a finding that this 
was not a difficult custody case and that clearly the recommendation of the 
custody evaluator was that Mrs. Chapman should have custody of the children. 
The court further notes that while Mr. Chapman questioned the lack of a 
psychological evaluation of his wife, the testimony from Chuck Sharp was that he 
performed an MMPI-2 test and that in his opinion she had no psychological 
difficulties that impair her parenting ability. In spite of the recommendation by 
Dr. T. Brent Price and the lack of a custody evaluation which would show that 
Mr. Chapman should have custody, Mr. Chapman proceeded in the custody matter 
and also proceeded in trying to litigate the home issues even though he had failed 
to make the house payments as ordered by the court. The court finds that Mr. 
Chapman has the ability to pay the attorney's fees for Mrs. Chapman and 
judgment is entered against him in behalf of his wife in the amount of $14,550.00 
as and for attorney fees." 
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-3 (1998) authorizes a trial court to award attorney 
fees in divorce and custody proceedings. 
The criteria for attorney fees was stated in Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 497 
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(Utah App. 1998) rehearing denied December 1, 1998. 
"The decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily 
in the sound discretion of the trial court. See Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 
1384 (Utah 1980). However, the trial court must base the award on 
evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability 
to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees. See Bell v. Bell, 810 
P.2d 489, 493 (Utah Ct.App.1991). id at 947. 
The trial court in its alimony findings (R. 538 "Findings of Fact" |^16) found that 
Mrs. Chapman had "needs" of $3,257.116 as her monthly expenses and only has 
available the imputed income of $893.00, child support of $779.00, and alimony of 
$500.00 per month. Her combined monthly income of $2,172.00 still leaves her 
$1,085.11 short of her monthly needs. Clearly, she has a need for assistance on her 
attorney fees. 
The court found that Mr. Chapman has the ability to pay her attorney fees. As 
pointed out in the alimony analysis Mr. Chapman has disposable income of over 
$1,699.00 per month and his only listed debts from the marriage were $271.00 per 
month. Thus the court found he has the ability to pay her attorney fees. 
The Court found Mrs. Chapman's fees to be reasonable. (R.541) Mrs. Chapman's 
attorney fees were submitted by affidavit (R.505-506) and by proffered testimony (R.612 
6In his brief Mr. Chapman at p. 14 states: "the court did not find that Mrs. Chapman 
required $3,257.11 to enjoy the standard of living which she enjoyed during the marriage. 
However, Mrs. Chapman's counsel inserted said language into the Findings of Fact, which were 
objected to by Mr. Chapman's counsel." (footnotes omitted). If Mr. Chapman's argument is that 
the court's "bench ruling" cannot be supplemented by the written findings of fact signed by the 
court such an argument is clearly erroneous. See Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52, Boyer 
Co. v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112, 1114-15 (Utah 1977); and Erwin v. Erwin, ITS P.2d 847, 848-49 
(Utah App. 1989). 
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Feb. 12, 1999 Transcript pp.221-222). Mr. Chapman stipulated that if called, Mrs. 
Chapman's attorney would testify to the hours, the reasonable rate, and the fees were 
reasonable for the work involved. No objection was made at trial to the reasonableness of 
her attorney fees, and no objection was made to the court's bench ruling on attorney fees. 
(R.613 Feb. 25, 1999 Transcript p. 142). No objection was made to the Findings of Fact 
submitted to, reviewed by and signed by the trial court.7 
When the trial court determines the fees are reasonable, the wife has need of 
assistance and the husband has the ability to pay, the appellate level courts will not 
interfere with the trial court's award. See Childs v. Childs 967 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 
1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999) 
Mr. Chapman's argument is similar to the argument in Rehn v. Rehn, 91A P.2d 
306, 313 (Utah App. 1999): 
"Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the court's 
findings in awarding attorney fees. Specifically, he argues that 
the fee award is devoid of factual findings addressing Ms. 
Rehn's need for assistance, Mr. Rehn's ability to pay, and the 
reasonableness of the fee award. We disagree.' 
"A trial court has the power to award attorney fees in divorce 
proceedings pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 (1998). 
Such an award must be based on sufficient findings 
addressing the financial need of the recipient spouse; the 
ability of the other spouse to pay; and the reasonableness of 
the fees. See Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 604 
(Utah App. 1994); Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489,493 (Utah App. 
1991) (remanded for redetermination of attorney fees when 
7On page 15 of Mr. Chapman's brief he states that the language in paragraph 16 of the 
Findings was objected to by Mr. Chapman's counsel. There is no objection found in the court 
record to any of the court's findings. 
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court failed to address wife's need or husband's ability to pay 
fees). The court may also consider the "difficulty of the 
litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys, the reasonableness 
of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily 
charged in the locality, the amount involved in the case and 
the result attained, and the experience and expertise of the 
attorneys involved." Bell, 810 P.2d at 493-94. Whether the 
trial court's findings of fact in awarding attorney fees are 
sufficient is a question of law which we review for 
correctness. See Endrody v. Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166, 1169 
(Utah App. 1996) 
This is not a case where the trial court awarded Ms. Rehn 
$6,880 in attorney fees without explaining how it arrived at 
this amount. See Potter v. Potter, 845 P.2d 272, 274-75 (Utah 
App. 1993). Rather, the trial court found, among other things, 
that Ms. Rehn had the "need for assistance with attorney fees" 
appellant had "the ability to pay," that the fees were 
"necessarily incurred" by Ms. Rehn, and the work was 
reasonable given the scope and time of the case."... 
The comments in Mr. Chapman's brief "that an attorney fees award of $14,550 in 
Brigham City" (Appellant brief p. 17) and "[a] significant fact in this case is that it took 
place in Box Elder County, in Brigham City. It is unreasonable to attempt to charge 
$14,550 for a simple divorce and custody case in this rural town" (Appellant's brief p. 23) 
appear, at best, parochial. No appellate level decisions have been found which state that 
the venue of a divorce trial limits the attorney fees that can be awarded. 
Additionally, the assertions in appellant's brief that "an award of one-third the 
amount required is the proper standard" (Appellant's brief p.20) has not yet been 
accepted as the "measure" or "standard" for attorney fees in this state. 
Attorney fees were deferred until trial in each of the five Order to Show Cause 
hearings, with the trial court cautioning the parties that a party violating the court's 
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directives would be liable for attorneys fees. (R.181, Transcript Dec. 17, 1997 p.9; R.201, 
Transcript Feb. 24, 1998 p.40 p. 42; R.610, Transcript Oct. 27, 1998 p.9, p. 10). 
The record shows that throughout this litigation Mrs. Chapman's attorney 
expressed his dismay about the amount of attorney fees caused by Mr. Chapman's actions 
(R.610 pp. 6-7; R.613 pp. 133-134; R.492) 
Since the trial court considered all relevant factors in awarding attorney fees, an 
appellate level court should not overrule such an award. See Morgan v. Morgan, 854 
P.2d 559 (Utah App. 1993) cert, denied Sept. 1, 1993. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD REMAND THIS MATTER TO THE 
TRIAL COURT FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES ON THIS APPEAL. 
In Childs v. Childs, P.2d 942, 947 (Utah App. 1998) rehearing denied December 1, 
1998, this court stated: 
"In divorce proceedings, when the trial court has awarded attorney fees 
below to the party who then prevails on the main issues on appeal, we 
generally award fees on appeal. See Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1027 
(Utah Ct.App.1993); Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah 
Ct.App.1992). 
This matter should be remanded to the trial court for an award of attorney fees on 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court considered all relevant factors in making its alimony award and its 
award of attorney fees. The Court of Appeals should affirm the trial court's decision. 
Since attorney fees were awarded at trial, the Court of Appeals should remand this 
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case for additional attorney fees incurred on the appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 1SI- day of August, 2000. 
Jeff if vrnofne 
Mann, Hadfield & Thorne 
Attorney for Appellee 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Jeff R. Thorne of Mann, Hadfield & Thome #3250 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Zions Bank Building-98 North Main 
P.O. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone: 435-723-3404 
Facsimile: 435-723-8807 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DESIRE N. CHAPMAN, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) Civil No. 974100428 
BRAD ALAN CHAPMAN, GEORGE ) Judge Clint S. Judkins 
CHAPMAN and MARGE CHAPMAN 
his wife ) 
Respondent. ) 
This matter came on for hearing on the 12* and 25* days of February 1999 before the 
Honorable Clint S. Judkins. The petitioner was present and represented by her attorney, Jeff R 
Thorne of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne. The respondent was present and was represented by his 
counsel of record, Len Eldridge. 
RESIDENCY 
1. The petitioner is a resident of Box Elder County, State of Utah and has been for 
more than three months immediately prior to the commencement of this action. 
DATE OF MARRIAGE 
2. The petitioner and respondent were married on August 22, 1981 at Salt Lake City, 
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Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The parties were married 17.5 years. 
GROUNDS 
3. During the course of the marriage irreconcilable differences developed such that 
the very purposes of the marriage have been destroyed. 
CHILDREN OF THE MARRIAGE 
4. Three children have been born as issue of the marriage, to-wit: COREY SHANE 
CHAPMAN, born January 4, 1986; KHRISTOPHER DEVIN CHAPMAN, born February 22, 
1988; and DAKOHTA RAVIN CHAPMAN, born February 8, 1995. 
CUSTODY 
5. The court appointed Dr. T. Brent Price, Ph.D., a clinical social worker, to perform 
a custody evaluation. Dr. Price submitted a written report and testified in the matter. The court 
also heard evidence from other witnesses, but none of the evidence contradicted the findings of 
Dr. Price, and the court adopts Dr. Price's findings as the Court's Findings and sets them out as 
follows: 
RULE 4-903 CRITERIA 
A. The child's preference. The two oldest children view their mother as the parent of choice. 
They both have very strong feelings about wanting to be with their mother. Dakohta is 
too young to be given the PORT or the BPS. She is thriving and should not be separated 
from her brothers. See the PORT and BPS Section of this report. See Denver 
Development on Dakohta. 
B. The benefit of keeping siblings together. The children have a strong bond with each other. 
They are attached and enjoy each others company. They should not be separated. 
C. Strength of child's bond with both parents. The boys view their mother as the parent of 
choice. They do not view their father as have a lot of parenting traits which fit their needs. 
Corey is very angry at his father and will not visit him or his grandparents. He has a lot of 
angry feelings and beliefs about his father. Desire reports that she tries to get Corey to 
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visit with his father and grandparents. She knows he needs to have a positive relationship 
with his father. 
D. The general interest in continuing previously determined custody arrangements where the 
child is happy and well adjusted. This is a divorce action and custody has not yet been 
established. This report will provide information for the court. 
E. Factors relating to the parents character or status or their capacity or willingness to 
function as parents, including: 
i. Moral character and emotional stability. Brad belongs to the church his father 
started. The Church of Individual Responsibility. He believes in this church and 
follows their principles. Brad through this evaluation, has been extremely 
concerned that I receive enough information, i.e. letters, court documents, names 
and other information. He wants to make sure that this evaluator has information 
about his wife and her behaviors. Brad would do well to spend time learning to 
parent, to understand the needs of children and learn better parenting skills. Brad is 
very close to his parents. In most cases this is a positive situation. However, Brad 
is not facing the reality of his parents aging. He believes that his mother can help 
care for the children in the event that Brad gets custody. Dr. Markeson outlines the 
illness of Brad's mother and that she really is not physically capable of caring for 
her grandchildren on a regular basis. Brad has been receiving therapy at Bear River 
Mental Health under the care of Mark Yaggie, LCSW. Brad is taking the following 
medicine: Zoloft, 200mg, daily and Trazodone, 50mg, at night. Desire seems to be 
focused upon her children. She does not use alcohol or drugs. She appears to be 
emotionally stable. She and her children have worked with Chuck Sharp, MS. in 
counseling shortly before and after separation. Brad and Corey were seen by Brett 
Sharp, MD, before he moved from Brigham. Corey was placed on Zoloft, lOOmg, 
daily. Brad reports that he and Desire also give Khris Zoloft, 50mg daily. 
ii. Duration and depth of desire for custody. Both parents are very desirous to parent 
their children. They are attached and to be involved in the children's lives. 
iii. Ability to provide personal rather than surrogate care. Desire, at the present time, 
works part-time and is able to take her daughter with her. Most of the day 
Dakohta will be able to be with her mother. Brad is away from home nine to ten 
hours each working day making it necessary for him to make daycare 
arrangements. Brad believes his mother (the children's paternal grandmother) can 
care for the children while he is at work. This arrangement is of concern because 
Brad's parents needs to be grandparents, not daycare providers. The children view 
their grandparents home as a place to go and have fun, not as their home. 
iv. Significant impairment of ability to function as a parent through drug abuse, 
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excessive drinking or other causes. Neither parent uses alcohol and drugs. Brad 
has in the past suffered from depression. He is receiving treatment and the 
appropriate medication. At the present time, his depression does not interfere with 
his parenting abilities. Brad, at time, is very intense and can be compulsive. 
v. Reasons for having relinquished custody in the past. Custody has not been 
established. This report will provide information to the court. 
vi. Religious compatibility with the child. Brad belongs to The Church of Individual 
Responsibility. Brad's parents founded this church about 20 years ago. He reports 
that this is a church which is recognized by Federal and State governments. Brad 
reports that the children do not belong to an organized religion. Brad reports that 
his church and the LDS church have been taught to the children. Desire and the 
children have been attending the LDS church. Corey is now in cub scouts. He 
reports that he likes this because his father would not let him be in scouts because 
of the Mormons. 
vii. Kinship. The children are close to the grandparents and with their aunt, who lives 
in Chock Creek. Brad reports the two younger children are close to their 
grandparents and Aunt. Desire has a grandmother and aunt and uncle who live in 
Brigham City. 
viii. Financial conditions. Brad works on a sales commission. In 1996, he grossed 
$36,000.00. In 1997, he made $43,000. So far this year he has made $15,710.24. 
Desire is working part time about ten hours a week. She brings home $75.00 to 
$110.00 a week. The information regarding financial conditions are what each 
individual reported. There was no effort made to verify this information. 
The court also adopts Dr. Price's Summary and Recommendations as the Findings of the 
Court. 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The children need a positive relationship with the paternal grandparents. The grandparents should 
be visited during their time with their father. The grandparents should not be used to pickup or 
drop-off the children. The rational is because of the anger and hostility between George and 
Marge Chapman and Desire Chapman. The children's grandparents need to have a healthy 
positive relationship with their grandparents. The grandparents need to be out of the visitation and 
custody issues of this divorcing couple. 
There has been a great deal of anger between Desire and Brad. This anger has resulted in physical 
violence. When this occurs, the children could be endangered. This couple does not communicate 
except in an angry, hostile manner, or they are silent. Therefore, shared custody or joint custody is 
not an option at this time. 
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Brad is extremely close to his parents. This evaluator is concerned about Brad's ability to 
independently care for his children without his parents support and help. During the evaluation 
Brad has not demonstrated his independence and ability to care for his children. 
All three children do not view their grandparents home as their own. They view their home with 
their mother as their primary residence. Desire's home is a child-centered home. Her life is 
focused around the care and raising of her children. Brad does not have a home. Possibly when 
the property settlement is completed he would be able to have an independent residence if he so 
chooses. 
This evaluator is aware that George and Marge Chapman helped Brad and Desire purchase their 
home and added financial support to this couple. They were trying to do their part. Desire 
believes that the Chapman's were too involved in their marriage. This is old news. The focus must 
be upon caring for the three Chapman children. 
Desire should be the custodial parent. Her home should be their primary residence. She should be 
allowed to parent the children in a safe environment. The rational for Desire be the custodial 
parent is: 
1. The children view Desire as the parent of choice. 
2. She has demonstrated better parenting skills. 
3. She has better knowledge of important elements in interacting with children. 
4. She has demonstrated her ability as a parent. 
5. She knows her children's schedules, behaviors and friends. 
Brad wants to be involved in his three children's lives. He would like to have custody of his 
children. The reason he is not recommended to be the custodial parent is: 
1. The two boys do not view him as a parent of choice. (The BPS and PORT show their 
perception of their father.) 
2. He has not lived by himself with the children. He has not demonstrated independent 
parenting skills. 
3. The strained relationship with Corey. 
4. He was not able to deal with all three children in the observation at my office. 
5. He will be at work eight to ten hours each day. Desire does not have a full time job at the 
present time. 
He was a responsible parent and father while he was married. Since the separation he has 
requested to provide child care any time Desire needs help. He has had visitation on a regular 
consistent basis. He should be allowed to have the standard visitation with his three children. At 
the present time, his oldest son will not visit him. Corey needs to begin therapy with a therapist he 
trusts and then allow his father to help him work through his anger and frustration. If Corey is 
forced to visit his father at this time this may further distance Corey from his father. If Brad wants 
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the children to visit their paternal grandparents then this should be done on his visitation time. 
Because there are three innocent children involved in this divorce it would be well if the parents 
would communicate about the children on a regular consistent basis. Therefore, it is 
recommended that they visit a neutral therapist for five sessions to help them with their 
communication skills and parent plan. 
The two boys need to be under the care of a physician because they both are taking anti-
depressants. It is important that they are followed up by a medical doctor and therapist. 
5b. The court also heard the testimony of Dr. Lebroder, who felt that Dr. Price's 
evaluation did not contain enough information concerning the psychological evaluations of the 
parties. The court also heard the testimony by Mark Jaggi and Charles Sharp. The court finds 
that there is nothing in their testimony which leads the court to change its opinion that Mrs. 
Chapman should be awarded the custody of the children. 
5c. Mrs. Chapman, the petitioner, is awarded the care, custody and control of the minor 
children. 
VISITATION 
6. Mr. Chapman is awarded reasonable rights of visitation as defined by Utah State 
Law. A summary of the visitation schedule is attached hereto as Exhibit A and the parties shall 
follow that with the exception that during the Christmas vacation, since Mr. Chapman does not 
celebrate Christmas as a religious holiday but does have a celebration on the Winter Solstice, Mrs. 
Chapman shall have the children each Christmas Eve and Christmas Day, and Mr. Chapman shall 
have the children each Winter Solstice Evening and Day. Mrs. Chapman will have the children 
the first portion of the Christmas Holiday each year and Mr. Chapman shall have them the second 
portion of the Christmas Holiday each year. 
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INCOME OF BRAD ALAN CHAPMAN 
7. Brad Alan Chapman had the following income totals: 1994, $34,610; 1995 
$34,322.16; 1996, $34,489.37; 1997, $43,321.34; 1998, $31,936.96. Mr. Chapman's five year 
income averaged $35,735.97 or $2,978.00 per month. The testimony is that the 1998 income was 
lower than 1997 because the business changed locations and because of the change of locations, 
they had a downturn in work. 
INCOME OF DESIRE N. CHAPMAN 
8. Mrs. Chapman shows income in a negative amount for 1995; a negative amount in 
1996; 1997 she grossed $12,494.00, but she had not yet filed a tax return, therefore her net 
income was not available; in 1998, she showed income of $5,798.04 on her W-2 forms. Even 
counting the 1997 gross figure of $12,494.01, she has only grossed over 4 years, $15,498.58 or 
$3,874.65 annual income. Mrs. Chapman is not working a regular 40 hour work week. The court 
therefore will impute income to her at Federal minimum wage of $893.00 per month. 
CHILD SUPPORT 
9. Child support should be based on the uniform child support schedules, which show 
Mr. Chapman should pay to his wife $779.00 per month as child support. A copy of the child 
support worksheet is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
Child support shall commence with the month of February 1999 with one-half being due 
on the 5th day of February and one-half on the 20th day of February and one-half on the 5th and 20th 
days of each month thereafter. 
CHILD CARE COSTS 
10. Mr. Chapman should pay one-half of any child care costs incurred to enable the 
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HEALTH, ACCIDENT AND MEDICAL INSURANCE 
11. Each party should be obligated to provide health and accident and dental insurance 
on liiployment at 
reasonable cost. 
UNINSURED MEDu • !i£NSES 
12. Each party should be obligated to pay one-half of any medical, dental , npi i< HI I HI 
orthodontic costs im \\\ i rd in behalf of the minor children, and not covered by insurance. 
REAI, IS I \ll> 
13. Then lllii.i < IKTN a lengthy and time consuming dispute in this divorce regard i ^ the 
ownership o! a home located at bSl Norlh 100 West, Brigham City, Utah, the legal ilesuiplmn 
being: 
The following described property situated in Box Elder County, State of Utah, to«\\ it: 
Tt\ II) (HII "''I (III 
BEGINN ING A I THE NORTHEAST CORNER 01- 1 .OT ;. BLOCK, 56, PLAT 
"C", BRIGHAM: CITY SURVEY; THENCE WEST P> RI >DS. THENCE 
SOUTH 6 RODS; THENCE EAST 10 RODS; Till \C1 NORTH 5 RODS TO 
THE POINT OF BEGINNING 
Throughou! the course of the divorce, the court has received numerous motions and 
claims regarding this home and, the legal, effect of all, parties' actions and, conveyances The court: 
notes that Mr Chapman's parents, (ieorge anr • * s 
"* cc action ht\ e to the \ nansicmv m- v eir names 
I tne nome m^.^u:.^ .;.„ ww^* .^.*, w. a., m .a*vs 
apartment" on the home, the home was de $ ::l s: :!! t :: George and Mai ge Chapman by Brad and. 
Desire Chapman. The court finds that this conveyance was merely a fi nancia II auii i: a ngement I: :: 
enable the parties to obtain more money on a home loan. George Chapman did take out a 
Yi'U'iiin "i Ilium iiii Il lliii1 u Inns I  in i "Hi'n in i m s i d e r a b l i I r s h n i i i i i v in g a i d i i i p i llliiii U M 1 H I m i s u s e of t h e 
proceeds from that loa n "I he court finds that those proceeds were expended by Brad and Desire 
Chapman during the time frame in which the parties lived together as husband and wife and the 
expenditures wc*" ! * »ly expenses or used oil I he li i-nn 11  
Brad Chapman was ordered to make the mortgag' i p aj it nents on the home during the 
I .»., > r r _ ..ai.ing payments after the i \pt il 1998 payment 
Accordingly 5 Aoiiuiiistiation tiled a notice of default and had a trustee 's sale on 
February 1, 1999 and the home was sold under the trustee's sale. The court will rule that Mr. 
or any liability on the home whatsoever, including income tax liabilities, if any, 
The court has considei ed the interest of George and Marge Chapman in. the home and has 
ruled that between the parties the transfer wa -•- - - * • 
not intended to convey away the interes? of Brad and Desirr ("hapn-j^ I he -. r -
Se, and George and Marge Chapman are boi md by any provisions of Utah State Law including 
the I Jtah Rules of Ci\ il I ""i ocedui e in regai ds to the home and this action, 
D E B T S A N D O B L I G A T I O N S 
14. The parties formal' 9 r " an J e ^ h party assumed certain 
d •- . _ . . . . • 
o 
and obligations which the pai lh"< \#i',||»,,«! lu under their separation agreement and shall hold and 
save harmless the other from any liability thereon. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
1 5 . * - a proposed division c il: p M s :: na Il 
property. The court finds that the division is fair and equitable and will order that the division be 
as pei the petitioner' s exliibit V cop> of the items awarded to the parties are attached hereto as 
Exhibit C, which encompasses the terms of the petitions r's Exhit it 7 
ALIMONY 
16. II lllii I omul (IIIMIU III.ml liii < mi in llluiig lei in marriage us ddiiied tiiuki I Jluli Stale I aw 
and Case Law. The pat (ir \ Iiu i. m Ihrrn married 17.5 years. The court finds that Mr. Chapman has 
mon .. .-.come o: a>~ *,& */v a.iu iimi n^ shaie ol the child support would be $779 00 lea*" 
him ww * 
monthlv mcor of the child MJPP- -H would be $233.00 leading he: *vith 
'licfon: l-iix" \\\w in, i«l l u v l"i I IK r ii • ecogmzes thai cadi pait> has certain tax 
consequences as the amount of money calculated does not take into account withholding -
taxes. The court finds that Mrs, Chapman has needs as shown by her Exhibit 10 of $3,257 ! 1 
v * 
amount of mone\ \* i * aiiabh- u contribute !.* he< aiimom A hue M:. Chapman 
d Lvpeiise amouni, :i.c <o**r, assumes u.«» ^ has ce^ai. 
living costs ^ ^ ises. The court determines that because this is a long term marriage tlh, 2 
court should equalize the post-divorce standard of living. Mrs, Chapman actually sought the 
amount of H7 70 ()(I In, i« in, mil 1I11111111s Wintiiiii nihil I'niilil 1 iifiiuilia1 I In |||uiiilirs [iiisil IIMMIM 
would basically need $1,699.00 less the tax consequences and therefore, he has the ability to pay 
alimony in the a i i ic i int of $500.00 per month. 
of February and on the 20th" day of February and one-half on the 5th and 20* days of each 
month thereafter 
CLAIM FOR JUDGMENT ON ARREARAGE ON HOUSE PAYMENT 
17. The court has conside t hapman's claim that she should be awarded 
judgment againsl I Ill < liapmiin I \ \u\\ Ihr house pjiyiiii'iil .i nulla nil U\ (111 
court. The court Is persuaded that the parties should, obey court; orders. Mr. Chapman has 
attempted to demonstrate to the court, that he did not have sufficient money to pay the house 
payment While the coi n I: Is int :: il: persuaded, that he did not ha 
payment, the court does note that it was possible that the parlies cc-Jii not atford \\K -
there likelj w ould not have been equil, in lln. In mil anyuas \\ \ i n dmgl>, the coml mil nol 
entered any judgment against Mr. Chapman for his failure to pa> the house payment, but as 
addressed below, the court is going to award attorney fees in favor of Mrs. Chapman 
A 1 1 E A II \ GESOFSl IPPORT I JNDERTm * ; 
18. The court notes that the Office of Recovery Services is attempting to collect child 
support and alimony arrearages under tl i.e temporary on: dei I he pai ties are v, illing to leave to the 
Office of Recovery Services any determination of arrearages of child si ipport and alimony under 
the temporary order, Through December 1998, it appears that Mr. Chapman was $1,241 00 
c 1 
ill 1 
defer to them for a determination. 
A R R E A R A G E S O N U T I L I T I E S A N D CHILD C A R E 
19. Mr. Chapman has failed to pay his share of utilities under the temporary or de i: in 
t 
therefore enter against him in (lit amount of $285.04. 
TAX EXEMPTIONS 
20. The court will order that li li s Chapma n be awarded the tax eveinplii IIII li HI lliiii 
daughter Dakohta. Mr. Chapma n sh : i ilcl be awarded the tax exemption for the son, Kristophe i: , 
a s should alter nat 2 the e xen lption for ("' Jim, >, I V m m c n u n g I'WI ( and every e v e n 
numbered year thereafter, Brad Chapman should get the exemption for Corey. Commencing 1999 
and every odd numbered year thereafter, Desire Chapman should get the exemption for Corey. 
Mi I Ihapiraiii's lit hi I I IIIIII in I MMiiplnin Ini in ill lllliip i Inlilini i niiiililntiinl iipiin IIIIIII lnii)^ 
current on all child support and alimony payments as ordered by this court:. 
2 1 . It appears that Dakohta 's inji iry suffered at an Ogden Raptor ' s baseball game, has 
been covered by Medicaid. Mrs. Chapman asked the court, to r ule that Mr. Chapman be 
responsible lim ill IIIMM lists mil i^priM" 11K IIIIIII ilm IIII I Iiiiiiiiii lliiiiiil IN 11 l hapiiiiin 
supervision v* as necessarily negligent, although the court: does emphasize that parents do have the 
responsibility to supervise their children, and tl lerefore w ill n lake no or der as to any uncovered 
expenses. 
A T T O R N E Y ' S F E E S 
22. 1 
that there has been numerous mot ions and filings made by Mr. Chapman and his parents r e g a r d i n g 
the h o m e . T h e r e has been no ev idence that Mrs. Chapman interfered in any r e spec t t o the sale o f 
T h e c o u r t finds that h e r attorney i '.Pi Ir rhorne, h a s expended 116 4 hours which the court finds to 
prepa ration for this mattei 1 he coui t finds that the charges of $125.00 per hour are reasonable. 
The court further finds that much of those expenses have been, incurred because of the actions of 
M r 1 I  in ii| i in in iiiiiii iiiii i mud i llliii mi in in mi in HI i liiiiilili ii iiii III llliiii i iiiiiiiii II mi in in i in 11 >• i (i in in li iii.1 Illliiiiiil illliiiH 
w a s n o t a difficult custody - a* •, J : early the recommendation of the custody evaluatoi was 
that J Irs. Chapman shoi lid have custody ol I he children I lit t ou i l liirther notes that while Mr. 
Chapman questioned the lack of a psychological evaluation of his wife the test- < 
Sharp' w a s that he performed an MMPI test and that in his opinion she had. no psychological 
and the lack of a custom :. which would show that Mr. Chapman should have custody, 
Mi Chapman proceeded ni die custody matter and also proceeded in trying to litigate the home 
issi; r . ^ the 
finds m a t M *s the abifm ti- pa \ m e auornev s fees IOJ Mrs C h a p m a n and j u d g m e n t 
is f.iiiliiiC'ill ii^  iii ns I lllliiiiiiiiiiii in III rhiill I IHiii'i vnillii IIIII 11 II IIIIIIK iiiiiiiiiill 11 "|i I I V»n nil as ,IIH,I lor <ill incs lt< s, 
A s C o n c l u s i o n s o f L a w from t h e fo rego ing F ind ings o f F a c t t h e c o u r t c o n c l u d e s a s 
follows: 
1. The m i n i hiis IIIIIIIII is In linn o f Des i re N ni i i |n i i i in mil Iii ri c I ' illliiiiiil I 'iMpiiiiiii il lie 
i i in in ill .ukri I'M |iiiiiiiis,i)n,liiMi nf < iroipe r iup i iMi i itml MiiijL'i.1 I hiipiiiiin 111 llllii IIIIJIICT. 
2. The court finds there is just cause for divorce upon the grounds of irreconcilable 
( -nces. 
3 j ] i e court determines that the sole care. , cm istody and control • 1 
should be awarded to the petitioner, Desire N. Chapman,, and that it would be in. the "best interest 
( i l l 111 1  r r t 1  i l l I n 1111 III 1 (in i< i ( l i n n 1 iiiiir In 11 III <i„ .11 Vi l l i i l l ill II 1 II inn 1  I in 111 (III in 1  in 
4. The court further orders that the divorce decree should reflect the court's 
* 'findings' :" dealing with the custody , th s isitati :: 1111, the child support, the child care costs, hea 1th 
accident and dental insurance, uninsi ired m 2 ::li, sal OIIIIIIIKHII HIIIII nUntil iIII urn nplnmrlrv expenses a 
provision dealing with holding Desire harmless from liability on the home; each party should pay 
alimony should be ordered as provided in the findings, that arrearages for support and alimony 
will be left to the Otlice of Recovery Services; that a judgment should be entered against Mr. 
Chapman f o r u n p m d ut i l i t ies and rh i l i l 1 IK l l i r 1 iiiiill I I I Y II 1111 r» II y\ null |iiil{tiiin iiiiill II 1 III11 I l l 
Chapmai i' s fa ilure to make the house payment but did take that in to consideration when ordering 
the attorney fees; Mn I lli(i|iiii.iiii made u laujiabk ollci ol settlement in Uttobei 1W/ and that 
offer was refused and Mr. Chapman proceeded to trial even though he did not have a ixasoe.ab.Ie 
chance of obtaining custod) of the children; that the attorney fees expended by Desire Chapw iiiiii 
a r o i v t r m m i ' i k l n i t i H l u l n i l i . i i i nil 1 n. . Ill, | , , „ ( , . | , | | . l ( | | 1 | s | i l | | i | l l | l I I I I |j I I11, II II II II II II | II III II II II II I, III III II II 1 ( i f 
$14^M] u<» hr;i ' i^* mid be responsible for any and all tax consequences on the home 
a * prniin hotti any liability; the tax exemptions should be 
a i; ii ai ded pursuant to the findings; and a decree of divorce should be entered encompassing the 
1 Ill 
substantive provisions as lounil in lliesi "bindings anc .. 
DATED this ^ dayofM£ehrl999. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE UPON OPPOSING COUNSEL 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, counsel for the Petitioner 
hereby certifies that he served a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
upon Len Eldridge, Attorney for Respondent, at 925 East 900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105, 
by mailing a copy thereof the ^2~day of March, 1999. 
JeffftThdrne 
MANN, HADFffiLD & THOK NI 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Notice of objection to the proposed documents niusl be submitted lo the Court and 
counsel within five (5) days after service. 
dpdivorcechapman/findings 
CHILD VISITATION GUIDELINES 
Effective May 5,1997 
30-3-33. Advisory guidelines. 
In addition to the visitation schedules provided in Section 30-3-35 and Section 30-3-35.5 advisory 
guidelines are suggested to govern all visitation arrangements between parents. 
These advisory guidelines include: 
(1) visitation schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are preferable to a court-imposed solution; 
(2) the visitation schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity and stability of the child's life; 
(3) special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child available to attend family 
functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies, and other 
significant events in the life of the child or in the life of either parent which may inadvertently conflict with the 
visitation schedule; 
(4) the noncustodial parent shall pick up the child at the times specified and return the child at the times 
specified, and the child's regular school hours shall not be interrupted; 
(5) the custodial parent shall have the child ready for visitation at the time he is to be picked up and shall 
be present at the custodial home or shall make reasonable alternate arrangements to receive the child at the time he 
is returned; 
(6) the court may make alterations in the visitation schedule to reasonably accommodate the work 
schedule of both parents and may increase the visitation allowed to the noncustodial parent but shall not diminish 
the standardized visitation provided in Section 30-3-35 and Section 30-3-35.5; 
(7) the court may make the alterations in the visitation schedule to reasonably accommodate the distance 
between the parties and the expense of exercising visitation; 
(8) neither visitation nor child support is to be withheld due to either parent's failure to comply with a 
court-ordered visitation schedule; 
(9) the custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial parent within 24 hours of receiving notice of all 
significant school, social, sports, and community functions in which the child is participating or being honored, 
and the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to attend and participate fully; 
(10) the noncustodial parent shall have access directly to all school reports including preschool and 
daycare reports and medical records and shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent in the event of a 
medical emergency; 
(11) each parent shall provide the other with his current address and telephone number within 24 hours of 
any change; 
(12) each parent shall permit and encourage liberal telephone contact during reasonable hours and 
uncensored mail privileges with the child; 
(13) parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate care and the court shall 
encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if willing and able, to provide child care; 
(14) each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the name, current address, and telephone 
number of the other parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name, current address, and 
telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court for good cause orders otherwise; and 
(15) each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious holidays celebrated by the 
parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the other parent does not celebrate shall have the 
right to be together with the child on the religious holiday. 
30-3-34. Best interests - Rebuttable presumption. 
(1) If the parties are unable to agree on a visitation schedule, the court may establish a visitation schedule 
consistent with the best interests of the child. 
(2) The advisory guidelines as provided in Section 30-3-33 and the visitation schedule as provided in 
Section 30-3-35 and Section 30-3-35.5 shall be presumed to be in the best interests of the child. The visitation 
schedule shall be considered the minimum visitation to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be 
entitled unless a parent can establish otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence. That more or less visitation 
should be awarded based upon any of the following criteria: 
(a) visitation would endanger the child's physical health or significantly impair the child's emotional 
development; 
(b) the distance between the residency of the child and the noncustodial parent; 
(c) a substantiated or unfounded allegation of child abuse has been made; 
(d) the lack of demonstrated parenting skills without safeguards to ensure the child's well-being during 
visitation; 
(e) the financial inability of the noncustodial parent to provide adequate food and shelter for the child 
during periods of visitation; 
(f) the preference of the child if the court determines the child to be of sufficient maturity; 
(g) the incarceration of the noncustodial parent in a county jail, secure youth corrections facility or an 
adult corrections facility; 
(h) shared interests between the child and the noncustodial parent; 
(I) the involvement of the noncustodial parent in the school, community, religious, or other related 
activities of the child; 
(j) the availability of the noncustodial parent to care for the child when the custodial paren is unavailable 
to do so because of work or other circumstances; 
(k) a substantial and chronic pattern of missing, canceling or denying regularly scheduled visitation; 
(1) the minimal duration of an lack of significant bonding in the parents' relationship prior to the 
conception of the child; 
(m) the visitation schedule of siblings; 
<n) the lack of reasonable alternatives to the needs of a nursing child; and 
(0) any other criteria the court determines relevant to the best interests of the child. 
(3) The court shall enter the reasons underlying its order for visitation that: 
(a) incorporates a Visitation schedule provided in Section 30-3-35 or Section 30-3-35.5 or 
(b) provides more or less visitation than a visitation schedule provided in Section 30-3-35 or Section 30-3-
35.5. 
(4) Once the visitation schedule has been established, the parties may not alter the schedule except by 
mutual consent of the parties or a court order. 
30-3-35 Minimum schedule for visitation for children 5 to 18 years of age 
(1) The visitation schedule in this section applies to children 5 to 18 years of age. 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a visitation schedule, the following schedule shall be considered the 
minimum visitation to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be entitled: 
(a) one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or the court from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 
p.m.; 
(b) alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 6 p.m. on 
Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; 
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and changes shall not be made to the regular 
rotation of the alternating weekend visitation schedule; 
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for 
the child's attendance at school for that school day. 
(e) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total holiday period extends beyond 
that time so that the child is free from school and the parent is free from work, the noncustodial parent shall be 
entitled to this lengthier holiday period; 
(f) In years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) Child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birth date beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the 
discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Human Rights Day beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the hSliday; 
(iii) Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Sunday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
and 
(vii) Christmas the first portion of the Christmas school vacation, ("Christmas School Vacation" means 
the time period begiAning on the evening the child gets out of school for the Christmas school break until the 
evening before the child returns to school, except for Christmas Even, Christmas Day and New Year's Day) plus 
Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is equally divided; 
(g) In years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) Child's birthday on actual birth date beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the 
noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) President's Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) Fall School Break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on 
Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vii) Thanksgiving beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m., and; 
(viii) Christmas the second portion of the Christmas school vacation, ("Christmas School Vacation" 
means the time period beginning on the evening the child gets out of school for the Christmas school break until 
the evening before the child returns to school, except for Christmas Even, Christmas Day and New Year's Day), 
plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p.m., so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided; 
(h) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 
p.m. on the holiday; 
(i) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 
p.m. on the holiday; 
(j) Extended "Summer" Visitation with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to visitation for the custodial parent consistent with 
these guidelines; 
(k) The custodial parent shall have an identical two week period of uninterrupted time during the 
children's summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation; 
(1) If the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's extended visitation shall be 14 of 
the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the custodial parent has holiday and phone visits; 
(m) notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks with the child shall be provided at least 30 days 
in advance to the other parent; and 
(n) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration. 
30-3-35.5. Minimum schedule for visitation for children under five years of age 
(1) The visitation schedule in this section applies to children under five years old. 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a visitation schedule, the following schedule shall be considered the 
minimum visitation to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be entitled: 
(a) for children under five months of age: 
(i) six hours of visitation per week to be specified by the court or the noncustodial parent preferably: 
(A) divided into three visitation periods; and 
(B) in the custodial home, established child care setting, or other environment familiar to the 
child 
(ii) two hours on holidays and in the years specified in Subsections 30-3-35(0 through (I) preferably in the 
custodial home, the established child care setting, or other environment familiar to the child. 
(b) for children five months of age or older, but younger than 10 months of age 
(i) nine hours of visitation per week to be specified by the Court or the noncustodial parent, preferably: 
(A) divided into three visitation periods; and 
(B) in the custodial home, established child care setting, or other environment familiar to the 
child 
(ii) two hours on holidays and in the years specified in Subsections 30-3-35(0 through (I) preferably in the 
custodial home, the established child care setting, or other environment familiar to the child. 
(c) for children 10 months of age or older, but younger than 18 months of age: 
(i) one eight hour visit per week to be specified by the noncustodial parent or court; 
(ii) one three hour visit per week to be specified by the noncustodial parent or court; 
(iii) eight hours on the holidays and in the years specified in Subsections 30-3-5(0 through (i); and 
(iv) brief phone contact with the noncustodial parent at least two times per week. 
(d) for children 18 months of age or older, but younger than three years of age 
(i) one weekday evening for two hours between 5:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. to be specified by the 
noncustodial parent or court; 
(ii) alternative weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 6:00 p.m. on 
Friday until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; 
(iii) visitation on holidays as specified in Subsections 30-3-35(c) through (i); 
(iv) extended visitation may be: 
(A) two one-week periods, separated by at least four weeks, at the option of the noncustodial 
parent; 
(B) one week shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; 
(C) the remaining week shall be subject to visitation for the custodial parent consistent with these 
guidelines; and 
(D) the custodial parent shall have an identical one-week period of uninterrupted time for 
vacation; and 
(v) brief phone contact with the noncustodial parent at least two times per week; 
(e) for children three years of age or older, but younger than five years of age: 
(i) one weekday evening between 5:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. to be specified by the noncustodial parent or 
court; 
(ii) alternative weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 6:00 p.m. on 
Friday until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; 
(iii) visitation on holidays as specified in Subsection 30-3-35(c) through (i); 
(iv) extended visitation with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(A) two two-week periods, separated by at least four weeks, at the option of the noncustodial 
parent; 
(B) one two-week period shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; 
(C) the remaining two-week period shall be subject to visitation for the custodial parent 
consistent with these guidelines; and 
(D) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninterrupted time for 
vacation; and 
(v) brief phone contact with the noncustodial parent at least two times per week. 
(3) a parent shall notify the other parent at least 30 days in advance of extended visitation or vacation 
weeks. 
(4) Telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration. 
Jeff R. Thome of Mann, Hadfield & Thome #3250 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Zions Bank Building-98 North Main 
P.O. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone: 435-723-3404 
Facsimile: 435-723-8807 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
)ESIREN. CHAPMAN ] 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
tRAD ALAN CHAPMAN et.al, ] 
Respondent. ] 
) PETITIONER'S PROPOSED 
PERSONAL PROPERTY DIVISION 
> Civil No. 974100428 
) Judge Clint S. Judkins 
COMES NOW petitioner and proposes the following personal property division: 
1. The children will retain their beds, dressers, student desks, toy box and plastic clothing storage 
shelves and boxes, their RCA portable television and VCR and their stereo system and CD players 
and all other property belonging exclusively to the children 
2. Brad would be awarded the following furniture, fixtures and appliances: 
• Queen size waterbed in basement bedroom 
• Computer desk in downstairs - Both parts 
• Brown rocking chair 
• Glass topped drink cart 
• Orange, yellow, multi-colored Sleeper Sofa downstairs. 
• (2) Entertainment centers down stairs 
Refrigerator downstairs 
Dining/Pool table downstairs and all 8 brown-backed chairs that go with it. 
1 large shelving and storage cabinet in the bathroom 
1 bookshelf 
1 Light colored 5-drawer dresser that is downstairs 
1 gray/blue filing cabinet 
Any shelving in the storage room he would like 
1 small dresser in front bedroom downstairs 
Computer table in the back bedroom (west) 
Brown dining room table and 9 wicker chairs that go with it including chair 
cushions. 
Large entertainment center in living room. 
(2) bookcases brown press board 
Refrigerator upstairs - kitchen 
Metal drawer set with wood top 
2-door cupboard in washroom, blue 
Brown long sofa table in the garage 
White desk in the garage 
Magnavox Color TV in the basement 
Sony color TV in the basement. 
(2) VCR's he had already taken from prior division of property with Desire. 
Microwave downstairs in basement 
CompuServe word processor, printer and associated parts 
Tandy Computer and associated parts 
(2) electric typewriters that are in the basement 
Any speakers, amplifiers he has in the basement 
White noise emitter. 
Small room heater - Brown 
RCA DSS Satellite System, amplifier, dish and Associated wiring. 
Large TV in garage in storage 
Hoover Vacuum and attachments downstairs (black) 
Elect dust broom - downstairs 
Lamps or lights that are currently in the basement at this time 
the stereo, amplifier VCR and speakers and any other components of the audio and 
TV system which he had agreed to take in the prior property division with Desire1. 
Toro Snowblower 
Elec. Table Saw 
Elec. Hand Saw 
Elec. All saw 
Elec. Drills, hand and portable 
New tool cabinet- both sections 
His own bicycle 
An equal split of rakes and hoses excluding any purchased by Desi after separation 
in June of 1997. 
His tools that are in the garage. 
His hand saws 
• 2 balance bars 
• Even split of the ladders. 
• Adj ./portable work Bench 
• Nails and building materials excluding carpeting 
• Plywood Boards 
• Drywall 
• White Wicker porch furniture, Rocking chair and table 
• Weed Eater 
• Bookcase and white shelving in garage 
• Wet/Dry Shop Vacuum 
• (1) Cooler 
• Fertilizer Spreader 
• the 1991 Saturn Car 
• the savings of $900.00, which was being kept in the Church of Individual 
Responsibility stocks and bonds. 
3. Desire would be awarded the following furniture, fixtures and appliances: 
• the 1992 Plymouth Acclaim 
• Computer desk and table upstairs 
• (2) Small brown bookcases, 3-shelf and 2-shelf upstairs 
• Gray sectional sofa and section table 
• (3) White bar stools 
• Telephone stand 
• Queen size waterbed upstairs 
6-drawer small dresser - upstairs 
The white press board shelf and cabinet shelf from Bathroom. 
Several pieces of carpeting 
Toshiba computer and all related Software, equipment and supplies 
Sharp copy machine and all related supplies and equipment. 
Canon Color Bubble Jet Printer 
Zenith Color TV 
Small 9" screen color TV and VCR combination 
(2) VCR's already agreed to give Desire in a prior Personal property division 
« 
Stereo, amplifiers, turntable, laser disc and all the Speakers Desire' is already using 
and were given to her in the prior division of property. 
JCP Microwave 
Eureka vacuum cleaner 
Hanging chain light 
White Oil space heater 
Any lamps, lights and fans Desire' is currently using upstairs and was given to her 
in a prior property Division. 
Whirlpool Washer and Whirlpool Gas Dryer 
Video Camera 
Small rotor tiller 
Propane Grill 
Telephone answering machine 
Ironing Board and Iron 
• the 2-wheel utility trailer 
• the Christmas decorations and any Other associated items to Christmas. 
• the small amount of camping equipment the family has as was given to her in a 
prior property division, including one cooler and Corey's cooler. 
• the small amount of fishing equip. 
• the small white portable storage shed in the backyard. 
4. The dishes, linen, pots and pans, blankets, towels, and other household items have already 
been separated and each party should be awarded those items already in their possession. 
5. There remains in the basement of the marital home several items belonging both to Desire" 
and Brad that will still need to be gone through and separated. These items consist of books, 
papers, mementoes, household repair items, small tools and hardware storage containers and 
other misc. items. There also remains several misc, items that need to be separated in the second 
storage shed. 
6. Both the basement and the storage shed need to be gone through by both Brad and 
Desire' together to figure out who wants to take what. The time needs to be when both parties 
can be there to go through things. 
7. Each party would be awarded any property he or she has purchased since the separation of 
the parties in June 1997. 
DATED this (1 day of January, 1999. 
JeffR^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 11* day of January, 1999,1 faxed a true and correct copy of 
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PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 6 
CHAPMAN V CHAPMAN 
Civil No. 974100428 
ALIMONY WORKSHEET 
Monthly Income 
Parent Share C/S 










Date of Marriage August 22, 1981 




PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 10 
Church & C h a r i t y 
C l o t h i n g 
30.00 
T O O " 
A u t o m o b i l e : 
Gas & O i l 80.00 
R e p a i r 
L i c e n s e Tag 
o t h e r T r a n s p . 
C h i l d r e n ' s E x p e n s e s : 
S c h o o l s u p p l i e s 40.00 
N u r s e r y s c h o o l -o -
S c h o o l T u i t i o n -o -
Lunch Money -0 -
A l l o w a n c e 40.00 





























Storage Bay 30.00 








Name of C r e d i t o r 
spy a^a rwn T.TST 























E l e c t r i c i t y 
F u e l O i l 
Gas 




























M o n t h l y Payment 
923.10 
TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES 
SUMMARY 
A f f i a n t ' s A v e r a g e Monthly Income 
L e s s A f f i a n t ' s T o t a l Mon th ly E x p e n s e s 
Ne t o r D e f i c i t 
893.00 
3257.11 
-2364.11 t PLAINTIFFS - CYuinir 
MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES 
Metropolitan Finance $ 89.00 per month 
Advance Loan 80.00 per month 
Quick Loan 128.00 per month 
Navey Credit Union 103.00 per month 
Quick Check 119.10 per month 
Express Check 100.00 per month 
Check Tec. 30.00 per month 
Quick Cash 50.00 per month 
Express Loan 163.00 per month 
Cache America Pawn 61.00 per month 
pjdpdivorce:chapmanmisexpenses 
